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Abstract
Scientific research on the banking crisis 2007-08 has answered many important
questions according to generally accepted methodological standards. However, there
remains at least one outstanding question that has not been answered with
methodological accuracy: What caused the severe USA banking crisis 2007-08? To
address this question the paper uses a counterfactual definition of ‘cause,’
distinguishes between separable and non-separable causes, and employs a well-posed
methodology for the causation analysis of singular events. In addition, first causes and
preponderant causes are distinguished. The main result of this paper is that the
preponderant causes of the banking crisis 2007-08 were securitization and ignorance.
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1.

Introduction

Financial instability happens when shocks to the financial system distort the
information flows in such a way that the financial sector finds increasingly difficult to
perform the task of channelling funds to productive investment opportunities. Those
shocks make the adverse selection and moral hazard problems worse, and thereby,
lending tends to dry-up. It is generally agreed that a financial crisis is an extreme case
of financial instability.1
Although the first major crisis of the twenty first century is usually referred to as the
‘financial crisis 2007-2008,’ it should be clear that the expression ‘banking crisis
2007-2008’ is a better term. Distinguishing banking crises from the broader category
of financial crises is not a mere terminological quibble. It is methodologically
improper to identify the group of financial crises F with the collection of banking
crises A because every banking crisis is a financial crisis, but the converse is not true.
Consequently, we can study the characteristics of A most effectively if they are not
merged with the characteristics of other financial crises such as currency crashes and
sovereign debt defaults.
As Reinhart and Rogoff (2008a), (2008b) have documented, financial crisis are often
linked to economic growth, capital inflows and financial innovation. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2008a) provide a panoramic view of eight centuries of financial crises “dating
from England’s fourteenth-century default to the current United States sub-prime
financial crisis.” These authors deal with five types of financial crises (banking crises,
currency crashes, inflation outbursts, domestic default, and external default) and use
quantitative thresholds and events to date crisis episodes.
Inspection of the annotated appendix in (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008a, esp. pp.75-88)
shows that it is important to realize that not all financial crises are banking crises.
Likewise, Calomiris (2009) signalizes that it is methodologically improper to mix
banking crises with other financial crises indiscriminately: “Banking crises must be
distinguished from the broader category of ‘financial crises’.” (Calomiris 2009, p. 5)
The assertion that the collection of banking crises A is a proper subset of the set of
financial crises F presupposes a definition of the term ‘banking crisis’ allowing us to
decide whether a crisis can be considered as an element of A or not. Any crisis where
the shock provoking financial instability directly affects the banking sector (regulated,
unregulated or a combination of the two) in a fundamental way is called a banking
crisis. Banking crises can manifest themselves by either panics conducive to a sudden
stop of the credit market or waves of bank insolvency. Calomiris (2009) has shown
that sometimes the two aspects (panic and insolvency) occur concurrently, but at other
times they do not coincide. This means that the collection of banking crises A consists
1
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of two subsets A1 (banking panics) and A2 (banking insolvencies) with non-empty
intersection and neither A1 is a proper subset of A2 nor A2 is a proper subset of A1.
While each banking crisis no doubt is distinct, comparative historical analysis shows
that the antecedents and aftermaths of banking crises –in both rich economies and
emerging markets– have similar patterns in housing and equity prices, unemployment,
and government revenues and debt. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009c). All banking crises
have an onset, an outbreak and a culmination. Severe banking crises end with
pervasive Knightian uncertainty and sudden stops.
The first severe banking crisis of the twenty first century started on June 20, 2007
when two highly leveraged Bear Sterns-managed hedge funds collapsed due to their
investment in sub-prime asset-backed securities (this event spread the news that
AAA-rated securities were not safe), exploded out of control on September 15, 2008
with the fall of Lehman Brothers, and culminated with a sudden freeze in the market
for short-term, secured borrowing in October 2008.
There are several points of general agreement about the USA banking crisis 2007-08,
including the following six. First and most obvious, the culmination of the banking
crisis was a singular event – in that it was a dated and non-replicable phenomenon
occurring at a particular location. Greenspan (2008). Second, the crisis displayed
multiple causative factors. Diamond and Rajan (2009). Third, the crisis was
stupefyingly complex. Brunnermeir (2009). Fourth, the financial system was
devoured by its own creations; in particular, innovations in the field of structured
finance allowed trillions of dollars of risky assets to be transformed into financial
products that were far riskier than originally advertised. Coval et al. (2009). Fifth, the
crisis was triggered by the burst of the USA real estate bubble and was magnified by
the extreme concentration of risk in a highly leveraged financial sector. Caballero et
al. (2008). And sixth, the rules governing the banking system encouraged risky
practices.
The last point deserves a special comment. Banks do not operate in a vacuum. Their
activities take place within a milieu that includes, but it is not limited to, the political
environment and the microeconomic rules of the banking game, such as the rules that
govern the operations of each bank (prudential supervisory rules, protective rules,
etc.). According to Curie (2006, 2010), the set of microeconomic rules of the banking
game is a key explanatory factor of banking stability (instability). This point is also
forcibly made by Calomiris (2009). In his review of the history of banking crises,
(Calomiris, 2009, p. 4) shows that “When the political equilibrium governing the rules
of the banking game changed for the better (worse) in a particular country, previously
unstable (stable) banking systems became stable (unstable).”
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Beyond those points of general agreement, there are many questions that will be
debated by academics, policymakers, and lawmakers for decades. One of the
outstanding questions is what caused the USA banking crisis 2007-08.
To examine the causes of the financial crisis, the USA Congress created a bipartisan
panel of ten members led by Phil Angelides, known as the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission. The Commission interviewed hundreds of witnesses and collected
additional evidence from a variety of sources, including case study investigations of
financial firms such as the American International Group, Bear Stearns, Citygroup,
Fannie Mae, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and Moody’s.
In January 2011, the Commission issued the first official report2 on the causes of the
2008 financial meltdown. Three compelling points can be made in relation to the
FCIR: (a) the FCIR was virtually ignored by the academic community, probably due
to the lack of analytical rigor and suspicion of political bias; (b) the collection of
possible causes mentioned in the FCIR is all-embracing; and (c) there was no unique
set of possible causes.
As can be found in the FCIR, it was not possible for the Commission to reach a
bipartisan agreement on the causes of the USA banking crisis. According to the
majority’s conclusions, the fundamental causes of the crisis are the following eight:
(1) Widespread failures in financial regulation and supervision; (2) Dramatic failures
of corporate governance and risk management at many systemically important
financial institutions; (3) Combination of excessive borrowing, risky investments, and
lack of transparency; (4) Government ill prepared and inconsistent; (5) Systemic
breakdown in accountability and ethics; (6) Collapsing of mortgage-lending standards
and mortgage securitization; (7) Over-the-counter derivatives; and (8) Failures of
credit rating agencies. (FCIR, 2011, esp. pp. xv-xxviii).
Some members of the Commission found areas of substantial disagreement with the
majority’s conclusions and presented dissent views. (FCIR, 2011, pp. 413-450). For
example, in one of the dissenting statements there is an explicit list of ten essential
causes of the crisis: I. Credit bubble; II. Housing bubble; III. Nontraditional
mortgages; IV. Credit ratings and securitizations; V. Financial institutions
concentrated correlated risk; VI. Leverage and liquidity risk; VII. Risk of contagion;
VIII. Common shock; IX. Financial shock and panic; and X. Financial crisis causes
economic crisis. (FCIR, 2011, pp. 413-439).
From the methodological viewpoint, the biggest problem with the conclusions of the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report lies in the fact that they are not derived from a clearly
formulated analytical framework. In particular, the report in question (a) has no
explicit definition of ‘cause’; (b) does not distinguish between separable and non2
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separable causes; and (c) has no explicit methodology for causation analysis.
Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that there may have been biases in the
conclusions of both Democrats and Republicans arising from the fact that this is a
politically motivated document.3
Leaving aside political stances, it should be emphasized that a narrative approach to
causality is fruitful as a first approximation but not as a second, for one fundamental
methodological reason. There must be an analytical framework in which to evaluate
the claim that one or more factors are the causes of a particular economic event.
To shed light on the answer on what were the causes of the USA banking crisis 200708, the paper uses a counterfactual definition of ‘cause,’ distinguishes between
separable and non-separable causes, and employs a well-posed methodology for the
causation analysis of singular events. In addition, first causes and preponderant causes
are distinguished. The main result in this paper is that the preponderant causes of the
banking crisis 2007-08 were securitization and ignorance.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 succinctly describes the banking
crisis in order to obtain a source of raw material to isolate plausible causative factors.
Section 3 sketches the counterfactual methodology for causality analysis. Section 4
compiles a list of plausible causative factors underlying the financial meltdown and
discusses their separability. Section 5 uses the counterfactual methodology to
structure a proof of causality in the context of the USA banking crisis 2007-08.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Crisis intertwined phases
Not surprisingly, the banking crisis 2007-08 has originated an explosion of articles. In
fact, there exists a large theoretical and empirical literature on this banking crisis that
enables a sound understanding of the complex dynamic process that led to a
catastrophic collapse in October 2008.
The dynamic process boils down to an explosive sequence of nine intertwined phases:
 Low interest rate environment;  Housing bubble;  Sub-prime market boom; 
Formidable credit expansion;  Ignorance;  Massive retention of toxic assets; 
Housing bubble collapse and systemic risk;  Complex environment; and Runs on
the shadow banking system and fire sales.
As a preparatory step to identify plausible causative factors, we start with a generally
accepted narrative of the crisis. We sketch only the most basic outline. More detailed
accounts are contained in the references in Table 6 (see appendix).

3
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 Low interest rate environment
The first phase of the sequence is given by the extended period of low interest rates
starting in the year 2000, approximately. It is generally agreed that there were two
concurrent factors conducive to this low interest rate environment. After the Internet
bubble and burst: (a) the Federal Reserve feared a deflationary period and adopted a
lax interest rate policy; and (b) excess world savings looked for safe debt investments and
the USA experienced large and sustained capital flows from foreigners. These global
imbalances led to the USA financial intermediaries to manufacture debt claims out of all
types of financial products.

The United States was not by any means the only country with low interest rates
during the first quinquennium of the 2000s. Then, why the collapse first manifested
itself in the USA? “Probably because the US innovated by securitizing sub-prime
loans, thus drawing more marginal-credit-quality buyers into the market!” (Diamond
and Rajan, 2009, p. 606).
 Housing bubble
The second phase of the sequence is the USA housing bubble where home prices
tripled between the mid-1990s and 2006. During the 2000s the USA mortgage market
shifted to a modus operandis in which mortgage brokers originated loans and then
sold them to financial firms that securitized them (‘originate-to-distribute’ model).
Quite obviously, brokers did not bear the ultimate costs of default and had no clear
incentive to screen applicants carefully. Low interest rates, easy access to mortgage
loans, abundant refinancing opportunities, and securitization of sub-prime loans were
the immediate determinants of the housing bubble.
 Sub-prime market boom
Borrowers in the sub-prime mortgage market differ from their prime counterparts in
several aspects, including risk, collateral, and credit histories. Indeed, sub-prime
borrowers are riskier, possess less collateral, and have shorter or worse credit histories
than their prime counterparts. Generally speaking, sub-prime mortgages were short-term
hybrids with a prepayment penalty. These mortgages were allocated to borrowers with the
lowest credit scores and highest loan-to-value ratios.

The sub-prime mortgage market grew substantially between 2003 and 2005. In dollar
terms, the share of non-prime mortgages (i.e. the aggregate of sub-prime and nearprime mortgages) as a proportion of the total USA mortgage market grew from 10%
in 2003 to 32% in 2005. (Mayer et al, 2009, p. 28).
The empirical evidence supports the view that low short-term interest rates softened
lending standards for companies, householders, and consumers. In particular, the subprime market boom of 2001-2006 was fuelled by a decrease in lending standards, as
6

measured by a decline in loan denial rates and an increase in loan-to-income ratios.
This softening was amplified by high securitization activity, weak supervision of bank
capital and too low for too long interest rates.
 Formidable credit expansion
Financial innovation led to a formidable credit expansion that helped feed the boom in
the housing market. In fact, the real estate boom and the corresponding leverage were
accompanied by an extraordinary credit expansion revolving around securitization in
residential and commercial mortgages, corporate loans and credit cards.
The high demand for AAA securities by foreigners and money market funds
magnified the re-securitization activity. In particular, the now-notorious CDOs, for
Collateralized Debt Obligations, were designed to satisfy the high demand for AAA
securities. Misleading ratings of these securities by the rating agencies further
exacerbated the manufacturing of AAA tranches of CDOs.
 Ignorance
Conventional wisdom disregards ignorance – in the sense of lack of understanding
about the nature of complex financial products and the risk associated with them – as
a destabilizing factor. This is probably due to the tacit presumption that ‘transparency’
is ubiquitous in the contemporary economy and, consequently, ignorance cannot
prevail.
Notwithstanding, there is evidence that ignorance played an important role in the
banking crisis 2007-08. As complex products multiplied from CDOs to CDOs of
CDOs (or CDOs2), it became harder and harder for investors to understand what the
quality of the underlying assets had to do with their value. The empirical evidence
points strongly toward a conclusion that even sophisticated investors did not take into
account the possibility of sharp declines in housing prices (neglect of tail risk) but
also did not have credible models for pricing re-securitized debt, particularly CDOs.
The former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Gordon Brown, is devastatingly
unambiguous:
We were to find that almost all the banks would have too little
capital to cope with a mispricing of the American mortgage market.
The entire world failed to fully understand the new financial instruments.
But so, it transpires, had those who devised, bought, and sold them. (...)
(Brown, 2010, p. 21)
 Massive retention of toxic assets
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Capital flows into the USA were non-speculative and in search for safety. In
manufacturing (perceived) safe assets, the financial intermediaries took on more
leverage, sourced assets such as sub-prime loans that carried higher risks, and retained
toxic assets.
There are at least three plausible reasons for the massive retention of toxic assets by
financial intermediaries (banks, for short). First, the retention was due to the fact that
banks accumulated massive risks counting on government rescue – the ‘too-big-tofail’ argument. Second, inappropriately designed arrangements for traders encouraged
them to take risks unknown to the top executives – the ‘moral hazard’ argument.
Finally, a third reason was the reluctance of large pools of investors to take any risk,
which led to the concentration of risk in banks. Faced with high demand for riskless
debt, banks diversified their portfolios by buying and selling risky loans. This
diversification provoked the so-called ‘diversification myth’: banks bought risky
loans to support the issuance of (perceived) riskless debt, increased the systematic risk
of their portfolios, and became interconnected by sharing each other’s risks.
 Housing bubble collapse and systemic risk
The housing bubble burst in July 2007 and vastly increased systemic risk in the
financial system. Decline in interest rates, easier access to mortgage loans,
appreciation of property values, and growth in refinancing opportunities are
individually benign market conditions, but jointly pernicious when synchronized. This
synchronization combined with the indivisibility of residential real estate (that
prevents home owners from deleveraging when home values decline and homeowner
equity deteriorates) results in the so-called ‘refinancing ratchet effect’:
Once property values decline, a wave of defaults becomes unavoidable
because mortgage lenders have no mechanism such as a margin call to
compel homeowners to add more equity to maintain their leverage ratio,
nor can homeowners reduce their leverage in incremental steps by selling
a portion of their homes and using the proceeds to reduce their debt.”
(Khandani et al., 2009, p. 2).
The refinancing ratchet effect gave rise to significant systemic risk in an otherwise
geographically and temporarily diverse pool of mortgages.
 Complex environment
At least two different types of complexity were present during the banking crisis
2007-08. First, structured finance created complicated and confusing products. The
intricacies of these financial products are best illustrated by the CDOs. These esoteric
financial products were created by investment banks to offload risk. In broad outline,
the CDOs were created by pooling together portfolios of mortgages and then
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separating them into different tranches (different classes of securities) with prioritized
claims on the collateral. The process of pooling and tranching produced some
securities that were riskier than the average asset in the collateral pool and some that
were safer. The safest tranche was the senior tranche and the riskiest the junior
tranche, usually referred to as ‘toxic waste.’ The senior tranches were constructed to
receive AAA rating.4
Second, there was complexity emerging from the evaluation of the financial situation
of counterparties (who owes what to whom). We can think of the financial sector as a
complex network of linkages. A node in this network is a bank. Banks are frequently
evaluating the financial situation of their counterparties. This network functions
smoothly in normal times. Even though banks do not know the financial exposures of
the other banks with certainty the auditing problem is tractable in normal times.
However, when a sizable shock happens – e.g. a large liquidity shock – in parts of the
network, the number of nodes to be scrutinized by each bank rises because the shock
may have impacted the bank’s counterparties. The auditing problem becomes
increasingly difficult to solve and, consequently, uncertainty pervades the network.
Faced with this uncertainty, the banks hoard liquidity.
Runs on the shadow banking system and fire sales
The term ‘shadow banking system’ refers to a section of the financial sector in which
some financial institutions carried out activities similar to those of a traditional bank,
but were unregulated. Investment banks financed some of their activities with
repurchase agreements, or “repos.” Repo contracts are short-term loans collateralized
by longer-term securities. For example, an investment bank borrows funds from a
hedge fund by selling collateral today and promising to repurchase it tomorrow.
Overnight financing required investment banks to roll over a substantial proportion of
their funding on a daily basis.
The fall in house prices induced a fall in the prices of securitized sub-prime mortgages
and the disclosure that highly leveraged investment banks were holding securitized
sub-prime mortgages shocked the financial markets. This, in turn, led to a
deterioration of the conditions in collateralized markets. For example, haircuts
increased and became increasingly difficult to borrow against low-quality collateral.
What developed in the late 2007 and into 2008 was a run on the shadow banking
system. The most visible of these runs was the collapse of the investment bank Bear
Stearns. In March 2008, there was a run on Bear by its clients. These ‘depositors’ pull
out their funds to enjoy a first-mover advantage (those who withdraw their money
early get their full amount while those who move late might not). On March 12, 2008,
4
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Bear was unable to secure funding on the repo market. The Federal Reserve bailed out
Bear Stearns through an arranged merger with J.P. Morgan.
Substantial liquidity interventions from the Federal Reserve, for example lending to
banks against risky collateral, stabilized the financial sector through the first three
quarters of 2008. In the wake of the Lehman Brothers default on 15th September,
2008, the financial system cracked. This event revealed that the safe debt created by
financial engineering was not truly safe.
Institutions that sold Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) such as the American International
Group (AIG) run into trouble.5 On 16th September, 2008, the Federal Reserve
organized a bailout of AIG ($85 billion) in exchange for an 80% equity stake. Finally,
banks’ balance sheets contracted due to massive losses on assets and withdrawals of
short-term financing. This prompted banks to liquidate assets in fire sales.
In October 2008 Knightian uncertainty was pervasive and the financial market
conditions deteriorated precipitously. There was a freeze of the credit markets.
Specifically, banks stopped lending; the issuance of corporate bonds, commercial
paper, and a wide variety of other financial products largely ceased; and creditfinanced economic activity was brought to a standstill.
The preceding sketch of the various phases of the banking crisis provides a number of
factors that prima facie should be taken into account as a starting point of causation
research. Before going into the identification of plausible causative factors, it is
pertinent to specify a general methodology for counterfactual causation analysis that
will be used later on.
3. Counterfactual methodology
The idea that causality is central to economics is at least as old as Adam Smith’s
(1776) foundational work. Indeed, the full title of Smith’s book, An Inquiry into the
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, signals that one of the most important
tasks of economics is the search for explanations involving causal connections. For
example, the importance of causal analysis to address specific policy problems is
undeniable.
The most explicit recognition of the importance of causality in economics was made
by Alfred Marshall in his Principles of Economics. Marshall’s notion of cause-andeffect relation revolves around the idea of ceteris paribus change:
It is sometimes said that the laws of economics are
5
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“hypothetical.” Of course, like every other science,
it undertakes to study the effects which will be
produced by certain causes, not absolutely, but
subject to the condition that other things are equal,
and the causes are able to work out their effects
undisturbed. Almost every scientific doctrine, when
carefully and formally stated, will be found to contain
some proviso to the effect that other things are equal:
the action of the causes in question is supposed to be
isolated; certain effects are attributed to them, but only
on the hypothesis that no cause is permitted to enter
except those distinctly allowed for.
(Marshall 1966, p. 30) [Italics in original]
3.1.

Dominant approaches to causality: structural and experimentalist

The most influential methodologies to causation in economics are the structural (or
econometric) approach (Heckman, 2008) and the experimental (or atheoretic)
approach, the latter based on statistical causality (Holland, 1986). Somewhat roughly,
econometric causality is based on structural equations models (which rely on the
specification of systems of equations representing behavioural relationships between
variables and parameters) and the method of controlled variation.6 Statistical causality
is an alternative approach to econometric causality based on the Rubin causal model
(Holland, 1986).
Both econometric causality and statistical causality often take advantage of the
presence of instrumental variables. These variables are excluded from some equations
and included in others, so that they are correlated with some outcomes only through
the effect on other variables. However, whereas econometric causality focuses on
‘causes of effects,’ statistical causality focuses on the ‘effects of causes’ (Holland,
1986, p. 945).
Discussing the myriad of technical issues associated with these two leading
approaches to causality in economics requires significant space, and we will not
undertake this task in the present paper. There are two reasons for overlooking the
technicalities inherent to the major approaches: first, the difference between the
structural and the experimentalist approaches has recently been clarified by Keane
(2010); and second, neither of them will be used in the rest of the paper.
3.2.

Two kinds of causation

Any analysis of causality should start by bringing into sharp focus the type of
causation to be examined. Essentially, there are two kinds of causation. First, the
6
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analysis may refer to instances of the same phenomenon. The causal analysis of a
reproducible phenomenon is called general causation. Typical economic examples of
this kind of causality include: the effects of a firm’s input on its output, the effect of
education on earnings, and the effects of employment training programs on
subsequent labour market histories. Both the structural approach and the
experimentalist approach have been extensively used to deal with problems that fall
within the category of general causation.
The second kind of causation analysis focuses on a dated and non-replicable
phenomenon occurring at a particular location such as the financial crisis 1930-33 in
the United States. Causation of the second kind is said to be singular. In this case,
facts do not permit the type of replicability that is present in much scientific enquiry.
Counterfactual reasoning is typically used to explore singular causality. A
counterfactual argument requires the analyst to posit: “What would have happened if
… had happened (or not had happened).”
3.3.

Hicksian approach to causality

One particular approach dealing with singular causation is due to Hicks (1979). In
rough outline, the counterfactual approach to causality involves three steps7: first,
formulation of a counterfactual definition of ‘cause’; second, given a collection of
plausible causative factors, distinction between separable and non-separable causes;
and finally, causality tests.
When there are several causative factors, it is necessary to distinguish ‘separable’
from ‘non-separable’ causes. If C is one of the causes of the effect E, then C can be a
cause of E by itself. In this case, C is called a separable cause. But there may also be
non-separable causes of E. It is said that a factor F is a non-separable cause of E if
either the existence of F presupposes that C must be present or F is brought about by
one or more separable causes.
3.3.1. Strong causation (single cause)
Consider two events, C and E that occurred at times T and T*, respectively, where T
and T* are not necessarily moments of time (they can be periods of time). According
to Hicks (1979, p. 12), to assert that C caused E presupposes that both C and E existed
and involves positing that
If C had not have happened, E would not have happened.

(1)

To test this basic definition, one must construct the hypothetical situation ‘C did not
exist’ (or briefly, ‘not-C’). The reason is easily seen. We know that C did happen, but
7
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we do not know what would have happened if C had not happened. In turn, the not-C
situation requires a model or theory of the way C and E are connected. The model
should provide reasons for thinking that events in reality may have been connected in
the way they have been hypothesized.
If we represent the expression ‘E would not have happened’ by the symbol , that is,
 ≡ E would not have happened,

(2)

the foregoing definition of cause can be slightly reformulated as follows:
‘C caused E’ if ‘not-C produces .’

(3)

This definition is only valid when C is the sole cause of E (strong causation), that is,
when there is no other potential cause which is admitted to be a cause of E (Hicks,
1979, p. 13).
The simple logic of single cause analysis can be condensed as follows:
Not-C
Produces 
Produces ⊕

implies
implies

Conclusion
C caused E
C did not cause E,

where
⊕ ≡ ‘E would have happened,’

(4)

Suppose that the event E represents the USA banking crisis 2007-08 and ask: What
caused E? One can always answer this question specifying a cause that is so general
as to be useless. For instance, we can claim that ‘capitalism’ was the cause of the
banking crisis 2007-08. The sheer number and variety of elements characterizing
‘capitalism’ makes the claim both trite and trivial. The ‘cause’ just mentioned reminds
us what Hayek (1967) suggested many years ago. The complexity of the economy
makes it possible for the economist to seek only the most prominent causative factors
at work prior to the occurrence of E.
3.3.2. Weak causation (multiple causes)
It should be clear that if there are several potential causes (say, the separable factors
C1, C2, C3, etc.) which may be operating to produce the effect E, the preceding
definition requires further refinement. The reason is clear. If C1 is not the but simply a
cause of E (but so is C2, C3, and so on), then the statement that the non-occurrence of
C1 implies the non-occurrence of E may not be valid.
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We now consider the simplest case of weak causation (two separable factors C1 and
C2). It is said that C1 and C2 are causes of E if one of the following two situations
happens:
(1) The effect E does not occur when either C1 is absent or C2 is absent or both C1
and C2 are absent
(2) The effect E occurs if either cause is present, but it does not occur when both
C1 and C2 are absent
The first situation can be symbolically represented as follows.
Situation 1
not-C1 and C2 is present, ceteris paribus, produces ;
not-C2 and C1 is present, ceteris paribus, produces ;
not-C12 ceteris paribus produces ,
where the symbolism not-C12 denotes a theoretical construction in which both C1 and
C2 are absent. In this case, it is said that C1 and C2 are additive causes (Hicks, 1979, p.
15). The present situation can be visualized with the help of Table 1.
TABLE 1 HERE
__________________________________________________________________
Table 1
Additive causes
The not-C1 construction is a model that allows the evaluation of the logical
connection between the statement “C1 absent and C2 present, ceteris paribus” and the
mutually exclusive outcomes “ (non-occurrence of E)” and “⊕ (occurrence of E).”
According to the first column of this table, if the statement “C1 absent and C2 present,
ceteris paribus” is inserted into the model the effect E does not occur. A similar
interpretation can be given to the not-C2 and not-C12 constructions. For example, the
last column of this table asserts that within the model “C1 absent and C2 absent,
ceteris paribus” implies the non-occurrence of E. All in all, this table asserts that the
effect E will not happen unless both causes are present.
Not-C1

Not-C2

Not-C12







_____________________________________________________________________
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Situation 2 captures the possibility that additivity breaks down. In symbols,
Situation 2
not-C1 and C2 is present, ceteris paribus, produces ⊕;
not-C2 and C1 is present, ceteris paribus, produces ⊕; and
not-C12 ceteris paribus produces 
This is the case of overlapping causes (Hicks, 1979, p. 15). Table 2 shows
symbolically the essence of overlapping causes.
TABLE 2 HERE
____________________________________________________________________
Table 2
Overlapping causes
The interpretation of the symbolisms not-C1, not-C2 and not-C12 is the same as in
Table 1. The first and second columns of this table assert that the absence of only one
factor (C1 or C2) is not enough to prevent the occurrence of the effect E. The message
conveyed by this table is that the effect E will occur unless both C1 and C2 are absent.
Not-C1

Not-C2

Not-C12

⊕

⊕



____________________________________________________________________
3.3.3. Limitations
There can be little doubt that the counterfactual approach is a coherent methodology
to organize thinking about singular causation. Its principal message is that theoretical
economics is a key tool for hunting the causes of singular events that cannot be
replicated. But praise does not imply perfection. Like most methodologies this
approach has weaknesses. Undertaking an evaluation of the Hicksian approach to
causality would take us too far afield. However, one example where the methodology
is inconclusive immediately suggests itself. Suppose that two well-specified models
Ma and Mb are suitable to accommodate the not-C construction. Suppose, in addition,
that model Ma produces  but model Mb produces ⊕. In this hypothetical situation,
Hicks’ account of causation turns out to be inconclusive. We are left, in principle,
with an indeterminate outcome.
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4. Identifying causative factors
For concreteness, the freeze in the credit markets that occurred in October 2008 is
identified here with the effect E in the causal relationship ‘C caused E.’ It is generally
agreed that E was caused by a combination of factors. For example, Archaya and
Richardson (2009a) state that “There is almost universal agreement that the
fundamental cause of the crisis was the combination of a credit boom and a housing
bubble.” The narrative of the USA banking crisis sketched in Section 2 provides a
source of raw material for the identification of the most prominent factors underlying
the credit boom and the housing bubble that provoked E.
4.1.

Listing plausible causative factors

Table 3 shows a list of nine plausible causative factors. This table omits complicating
factors such as the refinancing ratchet effect, the rating agencies, and the CDSs
because their role in the banking crisis was contingent on the presence of one or more
of the items enumerated in Table 3. For example, it is evident that the CDSs delayed
the occurrence of the financial collapse and constituted an important magnifying
factor of wealth destruction but they cannot be held responsible for the financial
crisis. The biggest problem was the fragility of the securities with bad loans in them,
not the CDSs.
TABLE 3 HERE
__________________________________________________________________
Table 3
Factors underlying the credit boom and the housing bubble
This table reports what appear to be the most important factors conducive to the credit
boom and the housing bubble emerging from comprehensive academic research. Each
of them suggests itself as a seemingly worthy candidate to be a cause of the USA
banking crisis 2007-08.
Plausible Causative Factor
F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
F6
F7
F8
F9

Name
Loose monetary policy
Global saving glut
Poor supervision
Sub-prime market boom
High securitization activity
Re-securitization
Ignorance
Excessive risk-taking
Too-big-to-fail

_____________________________________________________________________
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4.2.

Sifting causative factors

It is generally agreed that the origins of the crisis can be traced to two plausible
causative factors F1 (loose monetary policy) and F2 (global saving glut). Lax
monetary policy after the burst of the internet bubble combined with the high demand
for safe securities, especially from Asian central banks, constituted enabling
conditions for the banking crisis 2007-08.
Furthermore, there is no doubt that poor supervision (causative factor F3 in Table 3)
substantially contributed to worsening the opacity of the financial system. However, it
would be hard to argue that this factor in isolation provoked the financial catastrophe.
Supervision cannot restore transparency if the existing financial regulation is obsolete.
For example, the ‘shadow banking’ system was beyond the control of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) brings into sharp focus the sub-prime mortgage market
boom (causative factor F4 in Table 3) and developed an appreciative model to show
that one of the origins of the USA banking crisis 2007-08 was the abnormal size of
this market. Specifically, these authors establish a link between the credit bubble and
the deterioration of the lending standards in the sub-prime market. The model of
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) confirms that with sound lending standards the USA subprime mortgage market would have remained relatively small.
Allen and Carletti (2010) argue that loose monetary policy, particularly in the USA,
and global imbalances created a bubble in real estate prices in the USA and other
developed countries such as Spain and Ireland. These authors also argue that many
other factors such as high securitization activity (causative factor F5 in Table 3)
exacerbated the effects of F1 and F2.
Re-securitization refers to the process of pooling and tranching a whole set of, for
example, mortgages to spread risk differentially implemented by the investment
banks. The archetypal example of F6 (re-securitization) is the creation of CDOs. The
root problem with F6 was the lack of incentives to monitor the quality of the
underlying loans. It should be clear that F6 cannot exist without securitization because
re-securitization presupposes securitization. Therefore, F6 cannot be separated from
F5.
An efficient financial system presupposes that (a) people have easy access to all
relevant information; (b) the availability of information automatically implies a clear
understanding of the possibilities and limitations of the products in question; and (c)
all risks are recognized ex-ante. For lack of a better term, we call this presumption
postulate of full comprehension. For example, according to this postulate economic
agents are perfectly aware of the existence of worst states of the world associated with
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complex financial products such as the CDOs and they do not ignore the probability
of occurrence of the worst states.
If (for whatever reason) some risks associated with financial products are ignored, the
factor F7 (ignorance) is present. Gennaioli et al. (2011a) assume that investors and
intermediaries did not satisfy the postulate of full comprehension during the unfolding
of the banking crisis 2007-08 because they neglected tail risks.8 They argue that, with
the neglected risk assumption, new financial products provide false substitutes for
truly safe bonds and the financial system is fragile. Specifically, Gennaioli et al.
(2011a) state that, “A small piece of news that brings to investors’ minds the
previously unattended risks catches them by surprise, causes them to drastically revise
their valuations of new securities, and to sell them in the market.”
As to the second last plausible causative factor F8 (excessive risk-taking), there is
evidence that low interest rates induce imprudent risk-taking (Taylor, 2009);
(Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011). This suggests that F8 was brought about by F1 (loose
monetary policy) and F2 (global saving glut), and therefore, F8 cannot be considered
as a separable cause of E.
On the last causative factor F9 (too-big-to-fail), it is not inconceivable that the ‘toobig-to-fail’ phenomenon may have encouraged large and complex financial
institutions to take on too much risk. However, few economists would argue that the
expectation that taxpayers would end up footing the bill of bank loss was one of the
separable causes of the financial debacle at the end of 2008. It does not appear to be
solid evidence that F9 played a key role in engendering the banking crisis.
The foregoing discussion enables us to confine attention to the six factors shown in
table 4.
TABLE 4 HERE
5.

Causality analysis of the banking crisis 2007-08

The counterfactual approach to causality outlined in Section 3 provides a simple
framework which can be applied to identify the preponderant causes of the USA
banking crisis 2007-08. It should be emphasized that the following causality analysis
takes for granted the existence of a set of microeconomic rules for the banking game
compatible with banking fragility. This presupposition is based on a key lesson of the
history of banking crises identified by Curie (2006) and Calomiris (2009).
According to the counterfactual approach, the proof that S1 (loose monetary policy),
S2 (global saving glut), S3 (poor supervision), S4 (sub-prime market), S5 (high
8

If investors and intermediaries ignore tail risks, it is said that the assumption of neglected risk is met.
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securitization activity), and S6 (ignorance) are separable causes of E would require at
least one theoretical construction capturing these key factors. In reviewing the
literature on the banking crisis 2007-08, we have not uncovered any work that
incorporates all these six factors into a single model. It is likely that a model explicitly
involving such a large number of factors would be intractable or ambiguous.
_____________________________________________________________________
Table 4
Separable factors of the banking crisis 2007-08
The identification of separable causative factors is a pre-condition to implement the
counterfactual approach to causality. The elimination from Table 3 of F6 (resecuritization), F8 (excessive risk-taking), and F9 (too-big-to-fail) is based on logic
connections, empirical evidence, and lack of evidence, respectively. This leads to six
separable factors, denoted by S1, S2, ... , S6, that were present during the credit boom
and the housing bubble.
Separable Causative Factor
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6

Name
Loose monetary policy
Global saving glut
Poor supervision
Sub-prime market
High securitization activity
Ignorance

_____________________________________________________________________
5.1.

First causes and preponderant causes

Faced with this stumbling block, we posit a hierarchical classification of the causative
factors. The first causes of E are those separable causative factors that establish a
platform for the unfolding of the banking crisis. Archaya and Richardson (2009b), and
Rajan (2010) suggest that loose monetary policy, global imbalances, poor supervision,
and the sub-prime market were the first causes of E. The collection of these causative
factors can be thought of as a ‘crisis environment’ necessary –but not sufficient– for E
to occur. To guarantee the occurrence of E, there has to be supplementary and
powerfully operative factors. We call these high-powered factors which have to be
embedded in the crisis environment to provoke the freeze of the credit markets, the
preponderant causes of E.
Few economists would deny that securitization and ignorance were powerfully
operative factors at work prior to the occurrence of E. However, to argue that there
are reasons to believe that S5 and S6 constituted important separable factors in the
context of the banking crisis is not the same as showing that they were, in fact, the
preponderant causes of the crisis.

19

5.2.

Structure of the proof

Using the counterfactual approach to causation, it will be shown that C1
(securitization) and C2 (ignorance) were the preponderant causes of the crisis and
these separable causes were additive.9 To this end, it is necessary to find one or more
economic models such that the following conditions are satisfied:




C1 is absent while C2 is present ceteris paribus imply
E does not happen;
C2 is absent while C1 is present ceteris paribus imply
E does not happen; and
both C1 and C2 are absent ceteris paribus imply
E does not happen,

where the ceteris paribus clause includes the first causes of E.
Gennaioli et al. (2011b) have developed a model of shadow banking that brings into
sharp focus the implications of risk allocation through securitization. The risky loans
generated by the financial intermediaries are subject both to idiosyncratic risk and to
systematic risk. Outside investors are only interested in riskless debt. Securitization
enables the diversification of idiosyncratic risk, promotes the expansion of the banks’
balance sheets, and increases the links among them. In their model, a high level of
investor wealth triggered a chain reaction: expanded securitization, growing leverage,
growing assets of the intermediate sector, lower interest rates, and increased bank
risk-taking.
The novel result of the shadow banking model is that the elimination of intermediaryspecific idiosyncratic risks by securitization to underpin the issuance of (perceived)
riskless debt raises the exposure of these intermediaries to the tail aggregate risks. Or,
to put it differently, the model of shadow banking predicts the ‘diversification myth.’
This result is valid under either the rational expectations assumption or the ‘neglected
risk’ assumption.
It should be clear that the rational expectations assumption implies that the postulate
of full comprehension is valid. It should also be clear that the failure to recognize
risks ex-ante implies ignorance. What may not be as obvious is that under rational
expectations the shadow banking system is very stable, but the neglected risk
assumption renders the shadow banking system extremely fragile. The source of
instability is the neglect of aggregate risk (Gennaioli et al., 2011b).

9

The change in notation from S5 and S6 to C1 and C2, respectively, is just to facilitate contact with
Section 3.
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5.3.

Proof of additive causality

Using the shadow banking model as a theoretical construction to test for causality, it
is not difficult to prove that C1 and C2 are additive causes of the credit market freeze.
As mentioned previously, the proof of causation with two separable factors requires
the logical analysis of three distinct cases.
Proof of Case . In the absence of securitization, the shadow banking system is stable
even under the neglected risk assumption. The reason is obvious. If there is no
securitization activity, bank interdependence cannot grow.
Proof of Case . When securitization exists and all market participants hold rational
expectations, the shadow banking system is stable, and therefore, the banking crisis
cannot happen.
Proof of Case . A trivial prediction of the shadow banking model is that a banking
crisis cannot occur in the absence of both securitization and ignorance. This
completes the proof.
Table 5 provides a schematic view of the causality proof. It is easily seen that the
collection of the first causes together with the preponderant causes constitutes a
minimal sufficient condition for E to occur. This set consists of six separable
causative factors (see Table 4) and is ‘minimal’ in the sense that it does not contain
redundant conditions.
TABLE 5 HERE
6. Summary and concluding remarks
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was created by both the USA Congress and
the President to answer the question: What caused the USA banking crisis 2007-08?
The Commission interviewed more than 700 witnesses, held 19 days of public
hearings, examined millions of pages of documents, and published a 545-page report.
(FCIR, 2011). Using a narrative approach the report established that the crisis had
many causes and identified them.
Both the majority’s report and the dissenting statements are an account of events
without a clear methodological framework. Any identification of causes in this
fashion, even as a suggestive rather than a substantial result, must meet some
minimum methodological requirements to underpin its validity. Unfortunately, FCIR
(2011) does not define the meaning of ‘cause.’ It also does not make use of any
methodology for causation analysis applicable to single non-replicable events. There
are no tests to indicate if the identified factors were, in fact, separable causes of the
banking crisis.
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___________________________________________________________________
Table 5
Schematic view of the causality proof
The proof that securitization and ignorance were the preponderant causes of the USA
financial crisis 2007-08 is based in the Gennaioli-Shleifer-Vishny model of shadow
banking. The last row in Table 5 shows that inserting into this model the assumptions
corresponding to each case implies that the credit market freeze does not occur. Or, to
put it differently, the crisis does not happen unless both C1 and C2 are present.

Cases

Case 

Case 

Case 

C1
(Securitization)

Absent

Present

Absent

C2
(Ignorance)

Present

Absent

Absent

Causes

E







(Credit Market Freeze)

_____________________________________________________________________
To structure our exploration of the causes of the financial crisis 2007-08, we started
with a condensed narrative of the crisis. That allowed us to identify nine plausible
causative factors (see Table 3). Three factors, namely: re-securitization, excessive
risk-taking, and too-big-to-fail were discarded for different reasons (logical
connection with securitization, empirical link with loose monetary policy, and lack of
solid evidence, respectively). As a result, we arrived at a list of six separable causative
factors shown in Table 4.
The counterfactual approach to causality uses theoretical economics in a fundamental
way. To implement the causality tests, we need at least one theoretical construction
connecting all six causative factors. Regrettably, there is no formal model explicitly
capturing such large number of factors. However, there is persuasive evidence that
loose monetary policy, global saving glut, poor supervision, and the sub-prime market
were necessary conditions for the banking crisis to occur. It is for this reason that we
consider them as the first causes of the banking crisis.
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The set of first causes constitutes the ‘crisis environment.’ To guarantee that the
freeze of the credit markets happens, there must be supplementary and powerfully
operative factors at work in addition to the first causes, such as high securitization
activity and ignorance. We call these additional factors the preponderant causes of the
banking crisis.
Evidently, we know that the freeze of the credit markets did happen in October 2008
and that both C1 (securitization) and C2 (ignorance) were present; we do not know, in
the same way, what would have happened if both C1 and C2 did not happen. The
counterfactual approach to causality enables us to answer this question with the help
of economic models. Using the path-breaking model of shadow banking developed by
Gennaioli et al. (2011b), together with the counterfactual approach to causality, we
have shown that securitization and ignorance were the preponderant causes of the
USA banking crisis 2007-08.
As a final remark in this paper, we should mention the relationship between necessary
and sufficient conditions for the USA banking crisis 2007-08 to occur. As mentioned
before, the set of first causes is a set of necessary conditions for E to occur. When we
embed the preponderant causes into the crisis environment, we generate a set of six
causative factors that constitutes a minimal sufficient condition for E to occur.
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Appendix
The purpose of this appendix is to present in tabular form the anatomy of the USA
banking crisis 2007-08 together with a small sample of academic references extracted
from the massive literature associated with this crisis.

TABLE 6 HERE
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Table 6
Anatomy of the USA banking crisis 2007-08 and key references
This table provides the anatomy of the banking crisis and indicates some of the key
references associated with each of the nine intertwined phases of the USA banking
crisis 2007-08.
Crisis intertwined
phases
 Low interest rate
environment

Central facts

Sample of key
references

After the Internet bubble and burst, the
Federal Reserve adopted a lax interest rate
policy, and the USA experience large capital
inflows from foreign central banks and
governments seeking for safe investments.

(Brunnermeier,
2009); (Caballero et
al., 2008);
(Caballero and
Krishnamurthy,
2009); (Diamond
and Rajan, 2009);
(Taylor, 2009)
Case (2008);
(Mayer et al. 2009).

A housing bubble inflates in the mid-2000s.
The USA home prices tripled between the
mid-1990s and 2006.
 Sub-prime market Lending to risky borrowers grew rapidly in
the 2000s. Deteriorating lending standards in
boom
the mortgage market contributed to the
expansion of the sub-prime market. The
number of sub-prime mortgages nearly
doubled between 2003 and 2005. Non-prime
lending levelled off in 2006.
The housing bubble was accompanied by a
 Formidable
major credit expansion not only in the
credit expansion
residential mortgage area but also in
commercial mortgages and credit card
finance. The insatiable demand for AAA
securities magnified the re-securitization
activity. Leading rating companies reinforced
the hyperactive process of re-securitization
through misleading ratings of these
securities.
Complex bundles of obligations that was
 Ignorance
thought to spread risk efficiently, made the
resulting financial products extremely nontransparent. Market participants, including
the rating agencies, did not understand the
risks of the mortgage-related securities. The
difficulty of understanding the riskiness of
financial products such as CDOs was due to
the intricacies of the financial engineering
process.
 Massive retention Re-securitization resulted in a massive
retention of toxic assets by financial
of toxic assets
intermediaries. There are three possible
explanations for such retention: ‘too-big-tofail,’ ‘moral hazard,’ and ‘diversification
myth.’

 Housing bubble
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(Dell’Ariccia et al.,
2008); (Mayer et al.,
2009);
(Maddaloni and
Peydro, 2011)
(Benmelech and
Dlugosz, 2009b);
(Coval et al. 2009);
(Mian and Sufi
2009).

(Brown, 2010);
(Coval et al., 2009);
(Gennaioli et al.
2011a); (Gerardi et
al., 2008); (Jarrow
et al., 2007).

(Brown, 2010);
(Gennaioli et al.
2011b); (Rajan,
2010); (Shleifer and
Vishny, 2010a).

Table 6 –Continued

Crisis intertwined
phases
 Housing bubble
collapse and
systemic risk

Complex
environment

Complex
financial
products

Complex
auditing
problem
Runs on the
shadow banking
system and fire
sales

Central facts

Sample of key
references

The triggering event of the banking crisis
was the crash in the housing bubble. Nonprime lending drop drastically in the first half
of 2007. The USA home prices fell
spectacularly by about 30% in 2007-2009. As
the housing bubble collapsed, sub-prime
mortgages began to default. The 2007
dramatic fall in non-prime originations was
accompanied by a sharp rise in delinquencies
rates and vastly increased systemic risk. The
impact of these defaults was greatly
magnified by the ‘refinancing ratchet effect,’
and the complex bundling of obligations, e.g.
CDOs.
Complexity stemmed from complicated
financial products and the difficulty in
assessing counterparty risk.

(Mayer et al., 2009)
(Khandani et al.,
2009)

The slicing and dicing through repeated
securitization of the original package of
mortgages originated very complex securities
difficult to value.

(Benmelech and
Dlugosz, 2009a);
(Buchhiet, 2008)

When a sizable shock to the financial system
happens, the number of counterparties to be
audited rises. The problem becomes too
complex for the banks to figure out.
A run on the shadow banking system
developed in the late 2007 and into 2008.
After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
investment bank in September 2008,
disturbing events rolled out in quick
succession (particularly, bad news about the
value of mortgage-backed securities used as
collateral in the repo contracts). As the value
of mortgage-back securities fell and
uncertainty about their future increased,
many forms of short-term financing such as
repos dried up.

(Caballero and
Simsek, 2009a)

Collateralized lending was the most common
mechanism that precipitated forced sales of
assets.

(Caballero and
Simsek, 2009a)
(Shleifer and
Vishny, 2010b,
2010c)
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